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Yarbrough v. Commonwealth
551 S.E.2d 306 (Va. 2001)
L Faas
The defendant, Robert Stacy Yarbrough ("Yarbrough") was convicted in a
jurytrial of capital murder and sentenced to death for the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of Cyril Hugh Hambyduring the commission of a robbery
in violation of Virginia Code Section 182-31(4). In his first appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, Yarbrough's conviction was affirmed but the case was
remanded for a new penalty determination because the trial court failed to give
a jury instruction that a life sentence would mean life imprisonment because the
defendant would not be eligible for parole. On remand, a different jury sen-
tenced Yarbrough to death based on a finding of "vileness." On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia, Yarbrough raised the following issues: (1) the trial
court erred in allowing the Commonwealth's peremptory strike of an African-
American prospective juror in violation of Bason va Kvm&-X (2) the trial court
failed to grant Yarbrough's motion for mistrial based on improper comments
made bythe prosecutor during closing arguments; and (3) the trial court erred in
imposing a sentence of death.2
II Hddi
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the peremptory strike of an
African-American prospective juror did not violate the rule of Baurn because the
prosecution sufficiently explained the peremptory strike? The Supreme Court
of Virginia further ruled that the motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's
improper remarks during dosing was procedurally defaulted.4 The court deter-
mined the death sentence was not imposed under influence of passion, prejudice,
or any other arbitrary factor and was not excessive or disproportionate.' Thus,
the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Yarbrough's death sentence.6
1. 476 US. 79 (1986).
2. Yarbrough v. Commonvea 551 S.E.2d 306, 307-312 (Va. 2001); se Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 US. 79,97 (1986) (holding that purposeful discrimination based on race in selecting
jurors violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution).
3. Y dpme, 551 S.E.2d at 310; seeBaasor 476 US. at 97.
4. Yabq', 551 S.E2d at 311.
5. Id at 312.
6. Id at 313.
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A. Yarb 's BatsonC0 Ur
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that Yarbrough could not obtain relief
under Batsonbecause the trial court correctlyrled that the prosecution's explana-
tions for striking a certain juror were race-neutral According to the United
States Supreme Court, in order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in the selection of a petit jury it is necessary for the defendant to
show three things.' First, the defendant must show that he is a member of a
cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory chal-
lenges to remove fromthe venire members of the defendant's race.' Second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a
jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate." 0 Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice
to exclude people from the petit jury on account of their race." The defendant
has the burden of proving the prima facie case, but once proven, the burden
shifts to the prosecution to articulate race-neutral reasons for that strike. 2
Yarbrough claimed that the prosecution failed to present a valid race-neutral
reason for making one peremptory strike because the prosecutor stated that he
believed the juror made a "racial" comment." The prosecutor was unable to
hear the comment made bythe juror but stated that he had reason to believe that
the comment was "racial" in nature.'4 The Commonwealth gave several explana-
tions for striking the juror. (1) inability to hear the juror's last comment; (2)
belief that the juror's final comment was about race; and (3) concern that. the
juror, a teacher, might be sympathetic to the nineteen-year-old defendant. 5 The
trial court ruled that the Commonwealth's explanation that the juror might be
7. Id at 310.




12. Id at 97.
13. Ymiw5, 551 S.E.2d at 309.
14. d at 309. During the Baon hearing, the juror's actual statement was exposed. It
occurred during the following exchange:
EFENSE GO)UNSEL]: [Defendant] obviously is black The [victiml is white. I
you realize that. Do either of you think that would influence you in any way.
Do you t u might reach a different decision if they were both white?
MR- WOODSON: Ideal with both races everyday.
[DEFENSE COXUNSEL. I know you do.
Id
15. Id at 308-09.
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sympathetic to the nineteen-year-old was a sufficient race neutral explanation and
therefore denied Yarbrough's Ba&on challenge.'6
Under Basn, a trial court's determination whether the reason given for
exercising a peremptory strike is race-neutral is entitled to great deference.17 A
trial court's determination will only be reversed on appeal if it is found to be
"clearly erroneous." 8 The trial court in this case accepted the prosecutor's
explanation. 9 The trial court's determination that the prosecution's explanations
were race-neutral necessarilywas based on the court's evaluation of the prosecu-
tor's credibility.0 The Supreme Court of Virginia did not find that the trial
court's ruling was clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the ruling.2
B. Mxw.forMstia1
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's improper
remarks during the Commonwealth's rebuttal to defense counsel's closing
argument.' In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: "We used to have parole eligibil-
ity, and then a few years ago the legislature decided to abolish that ... .What
[defense counsel] is asking you to do is take a pair of dice and roll them and hope
that the law doesn't change again."23 Defense counsel objected to the remark
and the trial court instructed the juryto disregard the comment. 4 The prosecu-
tor also remarked, "I don't know what is worse[,] the fear that he gets out[,] or
the fear of what he is going to do with nothing to lose for the rest of his life."2"
Again defense counsel objected, but failed to ask for a mistrial.2 It was nearly
six months before defense counsel made the motion for mistrial based on the
prosecutor's comments.27 In the motion for mistrial, defense counsel also argued
that the trial court's cautionary instruction to the jurywas an insufficient remedy
to cure the Commonwealth's improper closing argument.2" The trial court, ruling
16. Id at 310.
17. Bai o 476 U.S. at 97; seaho Atkins v. Commonweath, 510 S.E.2d 445,454 (Va. 1999)
(holding that a trial court's determination as to whether the reason to strike a juror was race-neutral
is entitled to great deference).
18. Yrbn*, 551 S1.E2d at 310 (quoting Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352,369 (1991));
seAkis, 510 S.E2d at 454.












that the cautionary instruction was sufficient and refusing to assume that any
juror did not follow the court's instructions, denied the motion.29
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the motion for a
mistrial was untimely. The court noted that a motion for mistrial based on an
improper argument must be stated when the remarks at issue were made."
Because the motion was untimely the Court refused to review its substance on
appeal. When the prosecution makes a comment that is objectionable, defense
counsel must immediately, after the comment is made, object to the comment
and make a motion for mistrial or, if the court refuses to grant a mistrial, defense
counsel must ask for a curative instruction. If defense counsel fails to make the
objection, or makes the objection at the proper time but fails to ask for mistrial
as a remedy, then defense counsel has procedurally defaulted the claim, and the
issue will not later be reviewed on appeal or in collateral proceedings.33
C N-Waxiic kRetiew
The Supreme Court of Virginia is required under Virgiia Code Section
17.1-313(Q, to review a death sentence to determine whetr was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, or
whether it is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.' The court ruled that the
record failed to support Yarbrough's argument that the prosecutor's remarks
caused the jury to act with passion, prejudice, or in an arbitrary manner. The
court also did not find that the trial-court abused its discretion in declining to
change the sentence set by the jurys The court found, with some exceptions,
that the death sentence has generally been imposed when there is a finding of
vileness and the underlying crime was robbery"
Cynthia M. Bruce
29. Id
30. Id at 311.
31. ld;seeasoYeattsv. Commonwealth 410S.E 2d254,264(Va.1991) (holdingthatmalting
a motion for mistrial means making the motion at the moment the objectionable words are spoken).
.32. Yairmo, 551 S.E.2d at 311; see Schmitt v. Commonweath,547S.E.2d 186,200 (Va.
200(11 (holding that untimely objections to the Commonr aths comments during closing
arguments are waived).
33. SeVA. SuP. Cr. P, 5.25 (2001). The rule states:
Error will not be sustained to any r of the trial court or the commission before
which the case was ally tried unlei the objmeion was stated with reasonable
certaintyat the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court
to attainthe ends of justice.
Id
34. Yadtz*, 551 S.E2d at 311; VA. QODE ANN. S 17.1-313() (fMchie 2000).
35. Yad rt , 551 S.E.2d at 311.
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